A historical view of reason—and, consequently, of science—takes shape through two distinct approaches. In one approach, reason and science possess an identity and an essence proper to themselves. History or society determines the horizon, the situation, and, in Mannheim’s terms, the perspective (Standort) and the relation of reason to truth or truths. In the second approach, by contrast, reason—and thus science—is devoid of essence and identity and is reduced to the domain of will or other non-essential factors; reason is viewed as a human or social product. Within this approach, the factors that shape the identity of reason and science are numerous and heterogeneous, giving rise to a variety of theories. Some focus on individual factors and seek them in agents and actors, while others understand these factors as social and macro-level, whether cultural, economic, political, social, or the like.
Neo-Kantian and Continental approaches often adopt a reductionist and anti-essentialist view of reason and science. Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, and similar thinkers, by contrast, maintain non-reductionist approaches to truth, reason, and science. The instrumentalist interpretation is a reductionist reading of rationality and science. The interpretations of science or rationality offered by Nietzsche or Foucault also fall within this approach: Nietzsche regards the will to power, and Foucault regards power, as that which confers identity upon rationality and science. Within this framework, scientific rationality and consciousness are constructions that emerge in virtue of their function, influence, and consequences across various domains of human life and existence. Accordingly, the image of the world presented by rationality and science lacks epistemic validity and value and should not be considered independently.
Intersubjective and Cultural Rationality
In the Neo-Kantian approach, the historical view of reason led to an understanding of concepts and rational forms not as residing in the mind of the subject or knowing agent, but as situated within their historical, cultural, and social contexts—within the lifeworld and the shared mentality of actors—as an intersubjective phenomenon. Consequently, reason no longer possesses an abstract, fixed, and transcendent identity, nor is it a transcendental, quasi-transcendent, and immutable entity. Rather, as a cultural and historical phenomenon, it is introduced as an intersubjective rationality tied to the shared horizon of ethnic and social understanding. That is, reason is reduced to a rationality shared among human beings, and this shared rationality—having an intersubjective identity—is what determines the understanding, taste, and actions of agents within the framework of their ethnic and national identities. In other words, that which gives determination to human perception and action, and generates mental forms and, subsequently, individual and social actions, is no longer an angelic or exalted entity, nor something pertaining to the knowing subject and the mind of the knower.
In the Neo-Kantian approach, with culture placed at the center, the subject acquires a collective and intersubjective identity. In Kant’s view, the subject possesses a transcendental and quasi-transcendent essence and identity; however, in Neo-Kantian perspectives, the subject loses its stability and is situated within processes of change. Whereas in discussions of abstract and transcendent entities the question concerned how human beings relate to such abstract and transcendent realities in the processes of knowledge and action, with culture now placed at the center the question becomes how human beings relate to and interact with culture and the intersubjective domain.
A passage from Philosophy and Method of the Social Sciences
