By the functions of reason in relation to religion, what is meant are the various modes of contribution and functional involvement of reason within the domains of religious studies and religious practice. Reason performs numerous functions and yields many outcomes both in the position of inquiry within religion and about religion, as well as in religious commitment and in the realization (actualization) of religion. The function and application of reason in religious studies constitute one of the fundamental issues in the logic of discovering religious propositions and doctrines. Taken together, the functions of reason can be classified into the following three categories:
- Knowledge-generating (epistemic)
- Meaning-conferring (interpretive)
- Evaluative (critical/assessing)
The Knowledge-Generating Function of Reason
The knowledge-generating role of reason in understanding religion—which is its first and most important function—means that reason itself produces certain religious cognitions and makes them available to us. The proposition “God exists” is an epistemic statement that reports a mind-independent reality; it tells us that, outside the human mind, there exists a reality called God. Although “God exists” is a foundational religious proposition, it is not a product of transmitted sources (naql), such as Qurʾānic verses or the reports of the Infallibles (peace be upon them).
Prior to establishing the origin of religion and general and specific prophethood, and before verifying the probative authority (ḥujjiyyah) of the revealed Book and the words and deeds of the Infallibles, reliance on transmitted evidence entails circularity. One must first establish the existence of the God from whom the Prophet was sent and from whom the Book was revealed; only then may one appeal to transmitted sources to substantiate religious propositions. As is evident, the proposition “God exists” is the principle of principles of religion, and all doctrinal propositions of religion are grounded upon it. If there were no transcendent source or metaphysical foundation, sacred “oughts and ought-nots” and value-laden “permissible and impermissible” judgments would be meaningless. All doctrinal and ethical teachings of religion owe their intelligibility and value to this principle, and they are apprehended and established through reason.
That the principles of religion are sometimes enumerated as three, five, or even more is merely a loose pedagogical classification; in truth, the authentic principle of religion is one alone, namely the proposition “God exists.” Yet we further maintain: since God is Wise, Just, Merciful, and Gracious, He guides His creation toward the path of perfection; thus prophethood and the descent of revelation are established. And since He rewards the righteous and punishes the wicked, the Hereafter is necessary.
The divine prophets (peace be upon them) likewise refer the verification of this supreme principle of religion to human reason or innate nature (fiṭrah). They address the deniers of God’s existence by saying: “Is there any doubt about God, the Originator of the heavens and the earth?” (Qurʾān 14:10). That is, they invite people to return to their reason and innate disposition and consider whether it is possible for God not to exist. Accordingly, reason and fiṭrah play a knowledge-generating role and independently produce portions of religious knowledge.
A number of verses emphasize the epistemic productivity of reason, such as: “Thus does God bring the dead to life and show you His signs, so that you may reason” (Qurʾān 2:73); “Fie upon you and upon what you worship besides God! Will you not then reason?” (Qurʾān 21:67); as well as verses 2:164, 2:170, 2:171, and 8:22. Likewise, some verses regard knowledge as a source or instrument of truth-discovery and cognition parallel to the revealed Book, as in: “Bring me a book before this or some remnant of knowledge” (Qurʾān 46:4). Others consider hearing (transmission) and reason to be conjoint proofs and argue against the deniers accordingly, such as: “They will say: Had we but listened or reasoned, we would not have been among the inhabitants of the Blaze” (Qurʾān 67:10).
The Meaning-Conferring (Interpretive) Function of Reason
The second role of reason in religious studies is to confer meaning and articulate other sources of evidence. Without the application of reason, understanding transmitted texts is impossible. If the addressee of religion lacked reason, he or she would not be an addressee of religion at all. The very basis for humanity’s status as the addressee of religion lies in the degrees of human rationality; and it is through the exercise of this same endowment that human beings attain an understanding of sacred addresses.
Some noble verses point explicitly to the meaning-conferring role of reason, such as: “They hear the word of God and then distort it after they have understood it” (Qurʾān 2:75). This verse considers hearing the word of God as the material cause and preliminary condition for its understanding. Likewise, verses such as “Indeed, We have sent it down as an Arabic Qurʾān so that you may reason” (Qurʾān 12:2) and “Indeed, We have made it an Arabic Qurʾān so that you may reason” (Qurʾān 43:3) regard the eloquence of the Qurʾānic language as serving the possibility of rational reflection and comprehension.
The Evaluative (Critical) Function of Reason
The third role of reason is verification and semantic assessment. That is, when a particular cognition or meaning is obtained through other sources and indicators, reason subjects that meaning to evaluation in order to distinguish correctness from error. If, from the apparent wording of a verse or the statement of an Infallible, a doctrine or proposition is derived that conflicts with rational criteria and standards, reason compels us to re-examine it so as to recover the precise and correct meaning of the verse or narration. If attaining a rationally coherent and acceptable meaning proves impossible, we acknowledge our inability and refrain from further judgment at that point.
There is no doubt regarding the correctness of attributing the Qurʾānic verses to a revelatory source; however, if the apparent sense of a tradition conveys an irrational claim, one may legitimately question the correctness of its attribution to an infallible source.
The knowledge-generating, meaning-conferring, and evaluative roles of reason within the domain of religion manifest themselves both in the stage of discovering religion and in the application of other evidences and sources—for example, in facilitating the use of the Qurʾān and the verbal and practical tradition to uncover divine intent—as well as in the stage of realizing and implementing religion in practice.
