Ṣadrā’s ontological framework and his discussions of the soul are such that one must say he represents an existential leap beyond the Peripatetic (Mashshāʾī) and Illuminationist (Ishrāqī) traditions.
Familiarity with Peripatetic and Illuminationist doctrines should not lead one to examine or critique Ṣadrian principles on the basis of those frameworks; for the analysis and evaluation of the Ṣadrian school is possible only through its own distinctive methods and perspectives.
Mullā Ṣadrā, in addition to the intellectual immateriality affirmed by the Peripatetics, also establishes imaginal immateriality, and even introduces an issue he refers to as “supra-immateriality,” for which he provides numerous arguments.
In contrast to the Peripatetics, Ṣadrā advances the notion of the mode of existence of the soul, a concept of particular importance. At critical junctures in his philosophy, he draws upon and makes use of this conception of the soul’s mode of existence, which he himself has substantiated.
If one operates within the Peripatetic framework, the soul is conceived as an immaterial substance endowed with intellectual immateriality, standing alongside a material body. Its attachment (taʿalluq) to the body, its governance (tadbīr) of bodily functions, and its relational connection (iḍāfa) to matter are all understood as non-essential and accidental to the soul’s essence, rather than as constitutive features of its being.
In other words, within the Peripatetic intellectual horizon, the reality of the soul is a simple, immaterial substance to which the relation and governance of the body are added as accidental attributes. Ṣadrā, however, rejects this view. He maintains that governance of, and relation to, the body constitute one of the modes or aspects of the soul itself; that is, they represent a specific manner of the soul’s existence. Accordingly, in defining the soul, one must say that the soul is a single reality extending “from the Throne to the dust.”
In Ṣadrian thought, the mode of existence of matter is motion, whereas the mode of existence of the soul is a gradational reality, extended and continuous from materiality to complete immateriality. From this perspective, the soul’s connection with matter is regarded as a constitutive element of its very essence, such that with the removal of the body, the soul’s mode of existence collapses. Ṣadrā thus holds that attachment to the body is not an external accident whose elimination would allow the soul to be conceived as an independent and unchanged identity.
Selected remarks from the academic symposium on the philosophy of the soul
