A Prelude to Islamic Human Sciences

Mahdi ʿAbdullahi

Originally published on the second pilot issue of RISE

Introduction

The human and social sciences are disciplines whose subject matter comprises the existential dimensions and various activities of the human being qua human. These activities include the relations among human individuals, their interactions with external objects, as well as the institutions, structures, and outcomes arising from such actions. Human sciences first describe the multiple dimensions of human existence—individual, social, political, economic, ethical, and others—and subsequently offer programs for transitioning from the existing state to an ideal one in each of these dimensions. On this basis, the human sciences serve as the primary source for producing the “framework” required for the governance and administration of human society. An examination of contemporary human life further demonstrates that these sciences shape, direct, and even engineer people’s minds and modes of living.

On the other hand, a review of the various branches of the human sciences leaves little doubt that they are permeated with divergent, and often conflicting, schools of thought—positions that clearly cannot all be true or reflective of the genuine realities of human nature. For those who believe in the truth of Islam, this inconsistency is even more evident, for numerous claims within these disciplines contradict Islamic revelatory foundations, its anthropological, or its normative behavioral teachings. It was precisely this tension that sparked, within the minds of Muslim thinkers, the idea of reforming the human and social sciences—an idea articulated under various titles. These scholars sought to employ revelatory knowledge and the Islamic scholarly tradition to construct human sciences capable of offering a more accurate and complete depiction of the human being, along with a more appropriate action-guiding framework conducive to genuine human felicity.

A Brief Glance at the Historical Development of the Idea of Islamic Human Sciences

The convening of the “World Conference on Muslim Education” in Mecca (1977 CE) constituted the first spark of one of the most significant intellectual movements concerning the Islamization of knowledge. This conference led to the establishment of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) in the United States under the leadership of Ismāʿīl Fārūqī, as well as to the rise of similar initiatives elsewhere—such as the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) in 1983 and the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC) under the leadership of Sayyid Muḥammad Naqīb al-ʿAṭṭās in 1987, and Pakistan’s International Islamic University Islamabad (IIUI) in 1980, among others.

 

The global movement of religious knowledge production—or the international phenomenon of Islamic human sciences—entered a new phase with the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979 CE). The Revolution began with the transformation of the country’s political system and the establishment of a new order grounded in the political theory of Shīʿī Islam. Yet, the Revolution was never merely a political shift. Just as Islamic political jurisprudence is rooted in Islam’s foundational beliefs in ontology, theology, and anthropology, those same core doctrines carry their own implications for all other human and social domains. Further, due to its comprehensive and timeless character, the revealed religion of Islam possesses distinctive perspectives on various spheres of individual and social human life—such as politics, ethics, economics, education, psychology, sociology, and beyond.

Consequently, Iranian scholars and researchers undertook the project of reforming the human sciences in order to develop social and human sciences compatible with, or derived from, Islamic teachings. Thus, Islamic thinking within the human sciences emerged as a major scholarly project within Iran’s educational and research institutions.

This essay presents a brief articulation of the fundamental idea underlying Islamic human sciences and the nature of Islamic thinking with respect to these disciplines. To elucidate this approach to the human and social sciences, three issues must be addressed.

1) The Fundamental Components of Science

In their study and taxonomy of knowledge systems, Muslim philosophers and logicians believe that every discipline consists of three essential components: subject, problems, and principles. The main body of any science is composed of its problems, each of which is a proposition consisting of a subject and a predicate. The subjects of the propositions constitute the parts or particulars (instances) of the subject of that science, whereas the predicates represent the judgments or properties that—through an accepted method—are demonstrated for those subjects within that discipline. The subject of a science, therefore, is the general notion that encompasses all the subjects of its problems.^[1]

Assertive Principles (Mabādiʾ Taṣdīqī)

Inquiry into the problems of a discipline and the examination of the relation between predicates and subjects are often based on propositions whose validity must be established outside that discipline. These propositions are known as assertive principles, in contrast with conceptual principles (mabādiʾ taṣawwurī), which concern the definitions of the concepts employed in the science.

The mabādiʾ taṣdīqī are propositions upon which the investigation of a discipline’s problems depends, and they fall into two categories:

1. Axioms: Self-evident propositions that require no proof.
2. Postulates: Propositions that are not self-evident and require demonstration. In the discipline where they are proven, they count as that discipline’s problems; but in another discipline that presupposes their truth and builds its own problems upon them, they function as postulates.^[2]

Methods of the Sciences

Although Muslim logicians speak only of the three components—subject, principles, and problems—it is clear that solving scientific problems requires the adoption of a correct research method. The well-known tripartite classification of sciences—rational, empirical, and transmitted—illustrates the central role of method.

• Rational Sciences, such as logic and metaphysics, rely exclusively on rational demonstration and intellectual inference.
• Empirical Sciences, such as physics, chemistry, and biology, are verified through empirical methods.
• Transmitted Sciences, such as history, rijāl,^[3] and jurisprudence, depend on transmitted reports and documentary evidence.^[4]

The importance of method becomes more evident when we recall that in the seventeenth century, the shift in the natural sciences from a rational-deductive to a sensory-empirical method triggered a foundational transformation that gave rise to modern science. Likewise, the various methodological approaches in the human and social sciences—such as positivism, interpretivism, and critical theory—reflect differing perspectives on how the problems of these sciences ought to be investigated.

2) The Hierarchical Classification of the Sciences

Given the epistemological study and taxonomy of sciences described above—which understands the identity of a knowledge system to depend on the principles employed within it—the classification of the sciences must be conceived vertically. Since the principles of one discipline play a foundational role in establishing or negating the predicates of another, it follows that any science responsible for demonstrating the principles of another science structurally occupies a higher position.

If discipline B requires a set of principles whose validation lies within discipline A, then the formation and evolution of the problems of B logically depend upon the problems of A. Consequently, any transformation in A—in the problems that constitute the principles of B—directly affects the problems of B.

In this light, just as classical scholars referred to philosophy as “the mother of the sciences,” the most fundamental principles underlying the real sciences must be sought within the propositions and branches of philosophical sciences, which themselves are hierarchically ordered. The most foundational propositions are examined in epistemology. Next comes rational ontology, which seeks a universal worldview and the properties of being. A third level concerns philosophical anthropology, which investigates the essential characteristics of the human being.

a) Anthropological Principles of the Human/Social Sciences

Philosophical assumptions concerning human nature lie at the foundation of every discipline that studies human actin. As Roger Trigg observes, no one can say anything about human societies or human activities without having some conception of what kind of being a human is. Unfortunately, in most cases, these assumptions operate implicitly within the various disciplines. Only great thinkers can make them explicit. Even if we name only the simplest examples, the disciplines of history, social anthropology, sociology, and political science all operate with differing conceptions of human nature.^[5]

There exist anthropological questions whose answers cannot be sought from the human sciences themselves, yet resolving the problems of these sciences depends upon them. These include questions such as:

• Is the human being one-dimensional and material, or do they possess a dual nature?
• If dual, is the immaterial soul primary, or the material body?
• Which of the two constitutes the true essence of the human being?
• What is the relationship between the soul and the body?
• Is the human soul capable of perfection and development?
• What is the nature of the human being’s existential dependence on their Creator?
• Does the human being have epistemic need of their Creator, and in what way?
• Is human existence fundamentally contingent upon God?
• Is the human being eternal, or does their existence end at death?
• What relation exists between earthly life and the hereafter?

These and many other fundamental questions concern dimensions of human existence that the human sciences are incapable of answering—and indeed, inquiry within the human sciences presupposes that one has already adopted a position regarding them.

b) Ontological Principles of the Human/Social Sciences

Resolving anthropological questions depends on another set of issues that fall within the domain of ontology (first philosophy / falsafa ʾūlā). Topics such as the division of beings into material and immaterial, the principle of causality and its scope, the corollaries of causality (such as necessity), concomitance and correspondence between cause and effect, types of causes, and the distinction between real and metaphorical causation are all matters that profoundly shape one’s stance on anthropological issues. Indeed, ontology—metaphysics—is the second discipline that provides the foundational infrastructure for inquiry within the human sciences.

To understand the mode of reality of the entities discussed in the human sciences—such as society, money, government, and the like—we require firm metaphysical foundations concerning the types of beings (material and immaterial, real and conventional, etc.). Likewise, examination of the relations among human realities presupposes a prior analysis of the relations that obtain among beings in general, including causal relations and their types and properties.

c) Epistemological Principles of the Human/Social Sciences

Every inquiry within the human sciences rests primarily on resolving epistemological questions, such as:

• Is human knowledge realist or anti-realist?
• Is it absolute or relative?
• What are the sources and instruments of human knowledge?
• Is human knowledge confined to sensory and empirical knowledge, or does the human being also possess rational knowledge?
• Are conventional epistemic tools adequate for accessing all truths necessary for human guidance, or are there domains whose knowledge requires recourse to revelation?

d) Methodological Principles of the Human/Social Sciences

As noted earlier, method plays a fundamental role in shaping and identifying the structure of intellectual systems in the human and social sciences. Yet it must be emphasized that methodological frameworks arise from epistemology and are deeply shaped by epistemological presuppositions. The major disputes among schools of thought in methodology ultimately reflect their deeper disagreements in epistemic foundations. In other words, the epistemological outlooks of scholars impose definite methodological implications for research in the human and social sciences.

Epistemology teaches us that scientific questions cannot all be investigated using a single and uniform method; rather, human knowledge has diverse sources and instruments. The appropriate method for each field depends on the nature of its subject matter. Since the realities are not of a single kind, knowing each type of reality requires a method and instrument suited to it. Each epistemic source is effective only within the bounds of its proper domain: many phenomena around us are apprehended by the senses, yet hearing cannot perceive colors, and sight cannot detect tastes. Moreover, sensation suffices for sensible objects, while reason must be employed for intelligible matters.

The subject has access to many things, yet many other realities lie beyond sensory reach due to temporal or spatial distance. In such cases, one must rely on testimony and transmitted reports.

Furthermore, if we affirm the necessity of revelation and divine religion, and deem conventional epistemic faculties insufficient for grasping all layers of reality, then an additional epistemic source is added to our sources of knowledge—one capable of transcending the limits of purely human capacities. Thus, research in any discipline and the resolution of its problems depends on a sound methodological framework that is in turn largely derived from epistemology and rooted in the essence of its subject matter and the subjects of its propositions.

In conclusion, because assertive principles determine the identity of every science, the human sciences are arranged in a vertical hierarchy. The most fundamental principles of the human and social sciences must therefore be sought in philosophical sciences, whose claims require recourse to four major domains: epistemology, methodology, ontology, and anthropology. Different answers to questions in these four domains naturally produce different outcomes in the human sciences.

Conclusion

However, the human sciences require philosophical anthropology, which itself rests upon universal ontological principles articulated in rational ontology. At the foundation of all these disciplines lies epistemology, which analyzes the dimensions of human knowledge. Only after traversing these three philosophical fields—epistemology, ontology, and anthropology—can one properly address the human sciences, each of which examines a particular dimension of the human being. For instance, economic sciences are grounded in the economic dimension of human nature, political sciences in the political dimension, and so forth.

To make the discussion more tangible, a clear example can be provided. According to the Islamic worldview and philosophy, being comprises both material and immaterial realities, all sustained by the Necessary Being, God, the Most High. Human beings, on this view, are dual-aspect creatures, whose true identity is the immaterial dimension of their existence. Thus, human existence is not confined to the material world but continues beyond death. The human being is therefore a supra-material creature with a divine origin and an infinite, otherworldly destiny. Consequently, the ultimate perfection of the human being lies in nearness to God.

In contrast, materialist worldviews confine existence to the material realm and consequently deny any immaterial dimension of being—such as God, the immaterial soul, or an immaterial world. This leads to a one-dimensional conception of the human being: a creature severed from origin and resurrection. The human sciences arising from such a worldview will naturally study a human being without pre-existence and without an afterlife, and all their prescriptions will concern only this limited, worldly life and its material pleasures.

If a human-science scholar adopts a materialist conception of existence, he will inevitably regard the human being as purely material and deny any immaterial faculties. Human action will thus be analyzed exclusively through material, sensory factors. But if the human being is viewed as a creature with both a material body and an immaterial, enduring soul, then human life acquires an infinite dimension. In this case, one must evaluate human actions not only by their worldly consequences but also by their effects on eternal felicity or misery.

3) From Islamic Philosophy of the Human Sciences to Islamic Human Sciences

Western human sciences—economics, politics, education, sociology, psychology—have developed over centuries. As established earlier, their epistemic identity rests upon four foundational categories: epistemological, ontological, anthropological, and methodological principles. Some of the most important foundations include the following:

1. Epistemological Foundations:

Subjectivism, skepticism, relativism, idealism, empiricism, positivism, etc.

1. Ontological Foundations:

Materialistic conceptions of being, denial of causality or belief in chance, denial or neglect of final causality, etc.

1. Anthropological Foundations:

Physicalism, denial of the immaterial soul, dualism, the status of the human in the cosmos, severance from origin and afterlife, dimensions of human existence and their relation to each other, liberalism, secularism, primacy of material utility, mortality of the human being, etc.

1. Methodological Foundations:

Positivist, interpretive, and critical approaches.

By contrast, Islamic texts and disciplines—especially Islamic philosophy—contain views and arguments capable of supplying the fourfold foundations necessary for the formation of an Islamic human sciences. Transformation of the human sciences in accordance with Islamic teachings hinges first upon developing an Islamic philosophy of the human sciences, which provides the substructure of Islamic human sciences. Once this philosophical groundwork is established, their epistemological, ontological, and anthropological foundations emerge, and the logic and methodology unique to Islamic human sciences can be identified (or even established).

Upon accomplishing these two steps, one can conduct research within human-science disciplines. Producing propositions within the human sciences requires both sound foundations and appropriate methodological choices. Just as Western human sciences emerged from specific foundations and methodologies, knowledge production in the human sciences likewise requires traversing these two foundational stages—thereby making possible the creation of Islamic human sciences.

Thus, to realize Islamic human sciences, the philosopher of the human sciences must extract appropriate foundational principles from Islamic teachings and philosophy. Based on epistemological, ontological, and anthropological foundations, they must establish a methodology suited for research in the various branches of the human sciences.

In correspondence with the foundational categories of Western human sciences, the philosopher of Islamic human sciences must address issues such as:

1. Epistemological Foundations: Realism, foundationalism, sources of knowledge and their validity, sources of religious knowledge and their authority, the logic of deriving human-science propositions from religious texts, etc. They play a foundational role in the formation of Islamic human sciences.
2. Ontological Foundations: Distinctions between material and immaterial beings, the law of causality and its scope, its corollaries (necessity, causal concomitance and correspondence, types of causes, real vs. metaphorical causation), as well as the manner and extent of the influence of these foundations upon Islamic human sciences—foundations that distinguish the orientation of Islamic human sciences from materialistic perspectives.
3. Anthropological Foundations: The dual nature of the human being, primacy of the immaterial soul, the relation of soul and body, the development of the soul, comprehensive existential dependence on the Creator, epistemic need for God, immortality, primacy of the afterlife, etc., all of which shape the subject matter and direction of Islamic human sciences.
4. Methodological Clarification: Establishing proper use of valid sources for human-science inquiry, especially the role of transmitted evidence and methodology for employing religious texts in solving human-science problems.

After formulating such a philosophy of the human sciences, scholars within each discipline can—drawing upon the threefold foundations and the appropriate methodology—undertake rational, empirical, and text-based research. The results, due to alignment with Islamic teachings and systematic derivation from religious texts, will necessarily differ from conventional Western human sciences and will yield a system of knowledge harmonious with Islamic doctrine.

Conclusion

Given the four components that constitute every science—subject, problems, principles, and method—the epistemic identity of any discipline emerges from these elements. Furthermore, the orientation and overall structure of each human-science discipline arise from its assertive principles across epistemology, ontology, anthropology, and methodology.

Accordingly, the diverse schools and paradigms of the Western human sciences arise from differences in these four foundational domains. Likewise, the formation of Islamic human sciences depends on ensuring that the foundational principles underlying them are consonant with Islamic teachings. Thus, establishing Islamic human sciences requires grounding research in these four foundational categories so that the resulting disciplines rest firmly upon Islamic principles.

Bibliography

1. Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), Ḥusayn b. ʿAbdullāh (1405 AH). al-Shifāʾ (al-Burhān). edited by Saʿīd Zāyid. Qom: Manshūrāt Maktabat Āyatullāh Marʿashī Najafī.
2. Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, Muḥammad-Taqī (1386 SH). Āmūzish-i Falsafih. 7^th ed. Tehran: Shirkat-i Chāp va Nashr-i Bayn al-Milal.
3. Trigg, Roger (1999). Ideas of Human Nature: An Historical Introduction. Malden: Blackwell Publishers.

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Footnotes

1. See Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, 1386, vol. 1, p. 78. ↑
2. Ibn Sīnā, 1405, p.155. ↑
3. A discipline in ḥadīth studies that evaluates narrators’ reliability and biographical details. ↑
4. Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, 1386, vol. 1, pp. 76–77. ↑
5. See Trigg, 1999, p.6. ↑