What is the Claim of the Proponents of Realism and How Do They Prove It?
The problem of realism is one of the fundamental philosophical issues within the realm of epistemology. As a distinct discipline within the philosophical sciences, epistemology is a relatively new and nascent field. Although epistemological propositions have long been scattered throughout the works of philosophers under various chapters, epistemology must now be recognized and treated as an independent discipline. Although Islamic thought is inherently a realist paradigm, Allameh Tabatabai is the first Muslim thinker who, upon encountering modern Western philosophies, felt the necessity to engage in detailed epistemological discussions. He addressed this subject directly through his seminal book, The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism (Uṣūl-i falsafah va ravish-i riʾālīsm), as well as in his other works where appropriate.
Within this realist perspective, we posit two core claims: an ontological claim and an epistemological claim.
- The ontological claim asserts that there are realities existing outside of us whose existence and quiddity (nature) are not dependent on me as the knowing subject.
- Conversely, the epistemological claim posits that I, as the knowing subject, am capable of knowing these realities in principle (fī al-jumla).
Not only is this knowledge possible, but this possibility has also been actualized. Allameh Tabatabai places immense emphasis on the issue of realism. Those familiar with his works will note that in his books Bidāyat al-ḥikmah and Nihāyat al-ḥikmah, his gateway into philosophy is realism. He introduces the concept of realism by explaining that we encounter external entities, are influenced by them, and exert influence upon them. In the second stage, he demonstrates that we occasionally err in our recognition and knowledge of external matters; therefore, we require a science that investigates the laws of existence so that we may distinguish real entities from illusions. Thus, the fundamental claim of realism is this: there are realities independent of us that we can, in principle, come to know.
In Western thought, two major shifts occurred from the Renaissance onward.
- The first was the epistemological turn from realism to subjectivism, proudly and explicitly articulated in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, who described it as a Copernican revolution in philosophy.
- The second shift was the linguistic turn.
These very differences in epistemological paradigms and attitudes compel us to discuss this issue to determine which of these perspectives is logically convincing. Furthermore, this issue encompasses numerous dimensions, layers, and details, which naturally cannot be exhaustively covered in a single session. Another crucial point to note is that often—especially in the discourse of Western thinkers—when realism is mentioned, it exclusively refers to the external material world. However, the realism with which Allameh Tabatabai initiates his philosophy possesses a broader scope and is not restricted merely to the entities of the corporeal world.
Allameh’s Argument for Proving Realism
From the writings of Allameh Tabatabai, we can deduce an explanatory argument for proving realism, through which we realize the existence of external entities independent of the knowing subject, specifically characterized by materiality. What we encounter here is an argument that, according to philosophical terminology, can be classified as an innate self-evident axiom (badīhiyyāt-i fiṭrī). In various places, Allameh introduces the issue with the phrase, “There is no doubt in this matter.” He states that, undoubtedly, when we confront the world outside ourselves, there are objects that affect us; for instance, when we become thirsty, we seek actual, external water. However, we do not possess direct, unmediated knowledge of the essence of that water; rather, we attain reality through the mediation of mental forms and “acquired knowledge” (ʿilm-i ḥuṣūlī). Consequently, we apprehend the real world via these mental forms. Therefore, the very principle that there is an objective counterpart (mā bi-izāʾ) for a mental form is among the self-evident and innate propositions.
Philosophers subsequent to Allameh Tabatabai further developed this argument. The summary of the argument is as follows: when we encounter a new mental form and know that we did not create it ourselves, we are aware that this image did not exist previously and is originated (ḥādith). On the other hand, within the discourse of causality, we subscribe to the theory of contingency (imkan) and posit that every contingent being necessitates a cause. Subsequently, it is argued that the cause of this mental form is either myself or something other than me. Since I am not the cause, it must be an entity external to me. This portion of the argument successfully leads us to a cause outside the knowing subject.
However, we encounter a challenge here: how do we prove that this external cause is a material entity? After all, our current discussion of realism pertains specifically to the corporeal world. One might object that an immaterial being (mawjud-e mujarrad) could have generated this mental form.
In response to this objection, we must assert that for a corporeal cause to exert an effect on an object, a specific spatial relationship and position (nisbat va waz’) must be established between the cause and the object. We can draw upon this principle to finalize the argument: when I turn my head in a room, the image of a wall forms in my mind, but when I look downward, the image of a table appears. The fact that these newly originated mental forms fluctuate in accordance with changes in my spatial orientation demonstrates that a material entity is the cause of these mental images; this is because the relationship of an immaterial entity to matter is uniform, constant, and invariable.
Ultimately, this trajectory of reasoning—rooted in Allameh Tabatabai’s foundational insights and rigorously expanded by subsequent Islamic philosophers—establishes a robust framework for realism. By demonstrating that the origination and alteration of our mental forms are causally anchored to the spatial dynamics of material entities, he successfully bridges the gap between the knowing subject and the external corporeal world. Consequently, this argument not only neutralizes the subjectivist claims prevalent in much of post-Renaissance Western thought, but also firmly secures Islamic epistemology in the conviction that an objective, independent reality exists and is fundamentally accessible to the human mind.
